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A comparison was undertaken of confidence in 17 institutions in Ghana, Nigeria, Zimbabwe and the USA 
using data from the World Values Survey to find shared valuations and distinguishing characteristics as 
markers of cultural categories. Frequencies and rankings were examined and exploratory factor analysis 
was used to find plausible meanings of groups of institutions. The findings show that, although African 
respondents score institutions higher than their US counterparts, the rankings vary. With frequencies, 
the meaning is manifest. The analysis shows that 10 institutions load similarly on one latent variable 
and their combinations with the others indicate culture-specific characteristics. The latent variables were 
named ‘not-for-profit’, ‘for-profit’, ‘political’, ‘watchdog or fourth estate’ and ‘social order’ and they show 
Ghana is closer to the USA than to Nigeria, which is closer to Zimbabwe. The ‘not-for-profit’ variable 
is more important in the USA and Ghana and ‘political’ is more important in Nigeria and Zimbabwe. 
Institutional-specific loadings show that whereas the police and courts are grouped as ‘political’ in 
Nigeria, in other countries they belong to ‘social order’; and while universities are perceived as ‘for-profit’ 
in Africa, they are ‘not-for-profit’ in the USA. Comparing frequencies and rankings or dividing along the 
lines of individualistic versus collective or private and public sectors, masks the dynamic distribution 
of the systems of meaning in the local cultures; the latent variables approach therefore offers a more 
conceptually sound categorisation informed by shared and distinguishing institutions.
Significance: 
• Nigerians, as at the time of the survey, were yet to perceive the principles of separation of powers between 
political institutions, the judiciary and the police – an essential feature of a good democracy and a 
characteristic of other countries in the study. Zimbabweans and Nigerians perceive their public institutions 
in generally the same way with the domination of the political establishments while Ghanaians are closer 
to the USA in terms of the values they attach to their establishments with the most important group being 
the charities. The universities in Africa, as well as the civil service in Nigeria, are associated with business/
profit centres with the Nigerian labour movement also seen as political. The army also remains relevant as 
a part of the fourth estate in Ghana and Nigeria.
Background
African countries have in one generation been under colonial, democratic, minority and military regimes and some 
have fought civil wars.1,2 The political, social, economic and cultural experiences of individual African countries 
has thus varied. While many were under colonial rule, others were governed by minority governments. During 
colonisation, all institutions were controlled by foreign governments. Under military dictatorships, separation of 
powers, freedom of speech and political association were limited or suspended by decrees. Under minority rule, 
rights of the black majority were severely curtailed. The experience of the African public with its institutions has 
thus varied across the countries and this study is about finding the underlying common sources of influence and 
distinguishing characteristics in comparison with those of a long-established democracy – the USA. 
In many African countries, military establishment has been the unofficial opposition party, and at times alternated 
with the civilian government3 or provided internal stability4; the July 2013 coup in Egypt5 shows that military 
establishments are still politically active in Africa. Independence of the judiciary and police from regime influence 
is in doubt under military rule, as human rights and pro-democracy activists and journalists are detained, jailed or 
killed6-8, and under civilian rule, as the outcome of national elections are contested9,10. 
Southern African countries were free of military rule but were under white minority governments until 1980 in 
Zimbabwe and 1994 in South Africa. During minority rule, freedom of speech and political association were 
curtailed; several public institutions and places were segregated and access to political power, education and 
wealth was limited for blacks.11,12 There was, however, a 15-year guerrilla warfare with nationalist forces that 
engaged the white minority government in Zimbabwe13 and the anti-apartheid resistance movement in South Africa 
had a military wing, the Umkhonto we Sizwe14. 
Case studies: Ghana, Nigeria, Zimbabwe and the USA
The African countries Ghana, Nigeria and Zimbabwe were compared against the USA. Between independence from 
Britain in 1960 and 1999, when Nigeria’s last military rule ended, soldiers held administrative and legislative powers 
for 29 out of 39 years and in the period of democratic governance, the ruling party was not defeated at federal 
elections until 2015. From 1966 to 1992, there was a series of military governments in Ghana but since its return 
to democratic government in 1992, power has changed hands at the central government consistently between one 
political party and another. Zimbabwe has been free of military intervention in politics since independence in 1980 
but it has been governed by only one political party and president. By contrast, the USA has had a much longer 
history of democratic governance and transfer of power among political parties with the military confined to its 
constitutional role.
Research Article 
Page 1 of 8
2South African Journal of Science  http://www.sajs.co.za
Volume 114 | Number 5/6 
May/June 2018
Research Article Comparing confidence in African and US institutions
Page 2 of 8
The Hofstede15 score (https://www.geert-hofstede.com/countries.html) 
of individualism shows that Ghana with a score of 15 is more collectivist 
than Nigeria with a score of 30. The more individualistic USA has a 
score of 91 and no record exists for Zimbabwe. In addition to being 
collectivist, religion, which is inherently cultural in nature and shapes 
peoples’ psychologies in complex ways,16,17 is also important in African 
cultures compared with their Western counterparts. 
All three African countries are struggling with weak economies and – 
like other countries on the continent – corruption, which undermines 
confidence in institutions.18 In 2011, of 183 countries measured on the 
corruption perception index of 0 (highly corrupt) to 10 (very clean), 
Ghana ranked 69th with an index of 3.9; Nigeria ranked 143rd with 2.4; 
Zimbabwe 152nd with 2.2; and the USA ranked 24th with an index of 
7.1.19 On the economic front, per capita income – an indicator of personal 
wealth – was comparatively low for the African countries. Per capita 
income in 2011 for Nigeria was USD2514, Ghana USD1590, Zimbabwe 
USD769 and the USA USD49 800.20 Inflation figures, indicators of 
macro-economic stability,21,22 in 2011 (the year under review) were 
10.8% for Nigeria, 8.7% for Ghana, 3.2% for Zimbabwe and 3.1% for 
the USA. Zimbabwe, at the peak of an economic crisis in 2007, had an 
inflation rate of 24 411%.23
The experience of African publics and public perception of the roles of 
their institutions in society are thus very likely to be different across the 
continent and from their counterparts in the West. How these differences 
may act as markers of culture was explored in this study by comparing 
Ghana, Nigeria and Zimbabwe with the USA. For this research, the 
African countries are categorised as within culture while comparing with 
the USA is across cultures. The 17 institutions considered are churches, 
armed forces, the press, television, labour unions, police, courts, central 
government, political parties, parliament, civil service, universities, major 
companies, banks, environmental organisations, women’s organisations 
and charitable or humanitarian organisations. The study uses data from 
Wave 6 of the World Values Survey (www.worldvaluessurvey.org). 
Culture, trust and confidence in institutions
Culture and institutions
Confidence in institutions is an indicator of the underlying feelings of 
the public about its polity24 and is partly determined by subjective well-
being, political attitudes, values25, the state of the economy, employment, 
etc.26 Subjective well-being, ideas, attitudes, values and beliefs are 
non-material components of culture and the levels of confidence in 
institutions and patterns of interrelations among them, it is argued here, 
establishes categorisations which distinguish one culture from the other.
Culture consists of shared elements that provide the standards for 
perceiving, believing, evaluating, communicating and acting among 
those who share a language, a historical period and a geographical 
location.27,28 It is an embodiment of shared values and categorisations.29 
Noting the distinction and possible conflict between ‘inner’ and ‘outer’ 
models of culture, Mascolo30 proposes that culture be defined as a 
dynamic distribution of systems of meanings, practices and artefacts 
– an approach which underscores the multiplicity and location of 
meanings in culture. 
Also, collectivism and individualism are polythetic constructs whose 
attributes define cultures.31 Collectivism is maximal when a society is 
low in complexity and tight and individualism is greatest in societies 
that are loose and complex.27 Collectivism is high in African societies 
noted for strong family and in-group bonds, strong adherence to norms 
and multilingualism compared with their Western counterparts which 
are more individualistic and often monolingual. Gorodnichenko and 
Roland32 argue that countries with collectivist cultures are more likely 
to experience autocratic breakdowns and transitions from autocracy 
to autocracy.
Cultural mapping is important to identify shared elements and distinguish 
characteristics with a view to understanding how meaning systems are 
distributed27,28,30 and to know the mechanisms that are implied when 
certain values are endorsed and others are ‘frowned upon’33. The evolving 
patterns will enhance our understanding of the underlying feelings of the 
public24 about these institutions, in the countries of interest and others.
Familiarity, confidence and trust
Familiarity, confidence and trust are different modes of asserting 
expectations but they use self-reference in different ways. Familiarity 
draws the distinction between familiar and unfamiliar fields and aligns 
with the familiar while confidence emerges in situations characterised 
by contingency and danger, which makes it meaningful to reflect on 
pre-adaptive and protective measures. Trust, however, depends not 
on inherent danger but on risk which emerges only as a component of 
decision and action. Trust and confidence refer to expectations which 
may lapse into disappointments; a relation of confidence may turn to one 
of trust and, conversely, trust can revert to mere confidence, but it is not 
a simple zero-sum game.34 
Luhmann34 argues that a distinction between confidence and trust is not 
obsolete, although they belong to the same family of self-assurances 
and seem to depend on each other and are, at the same time, capable 
of replacing each other to a certain extent. For Luhmann, in the case of 
confidence, attribution for disappointment is external while for trust, it is 
internal. Also, lack of confidence will lead to alienation while lack of trust 
reduces the range of possibilities for rational action but the withdrawal of 
trust is not an immediate and necessary result of a lack of confidence. 
Leaning on Luhmann, Siegrist and colleagues35 propose that confidence 
is based on high levels of familiarity and can be had in just about anything 
while trust is important when familiarity is low and is directed at persons. 
Trust and confidence in institutions
Authors use the terms faith, confidence and trust in institutions 
interchangeably.26,36,37 Some pollsters and researchers use the terms to 
measure public feelings scaled as trust, confidence or faith in leaders, 
government and other institutions. Other researchers use them for 
different variables and at different levels. Twenge et al.37 use trust at 
the individual level and confidence at the institutional level. Cook and 
Gronke38 separated trust as that in government and confidence as that 
in institutions while Tyler36 used public trust and confidence together 
in research on legal authorities. Hager and Hedberg39 argue that 
institutional trust and sector confidence are different from each other but 
nested within a generalised social trust in unknown others. Again, is the 
distinction important, in particular, for research?
Lipset and Schneider26 suggest that while the terms may be varied in 
individual polls, all the results address the same issue: public mood, 
feelings or morale about its institutions. Also, Siegrist et al.35 argue that 
while the distinction between trust and confidence is a key element of 
certain theories of cooperation, the dual mode approach has had little 
impact on empirical studies. However, Newton40 cites Finland in 1990 
where social trust remained high despite the collapse of confidence 
in parliament and other public institutions and Japan where low and 
declining levels of trust in government are accompanied by high and 
increasing levels of social capital. Newton’s observation finds support in 
Luhmann’s argument that a social evolution which achieves increasingly 
complex societies may in fact generate systems which require more 
confidence as a prerequisite for participation and more trust in partners 
as a condition for the best utilisation of chances and opportunities.
Here, there is agreement with Lipset and Schneider26, but it is noted that for 
research purposes, a distinction is necessary, as argued by Luhmann34 
and extended by Siegrist et al.35 The findings of Newton40 are noted, that 
is, that cultural differences may make the distinction more important in 
some countries than in others as in Japan and Finland compared with 
Lipset and Schneider’s26 research focused on the USA. For analytical 
purposes, particularly in cross-cultural studies in which researchers 
are looking for differences and similarities, a separation of both terms 
is argued for here: trust for persons and confidence in institutions. As 
Luhmann34 argues, confidence is best for systems and trust for partners, 
indicating, for example, that you can have confidence in the judiciary but 
you need trust for the individual judges. This study, however, relies on 
confidence in institutions data from the World Values Survey Wave 6. 
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The study is constrained by unavailability of data to compare responses 
to both types of question wordings (trust and confidence). 
Confidence in institutions: State of research
Confidence measures have been used to monitor public perception of 
institutions following specific issues and events; to track changes on 
the longitudinal and to compare single items across countries. Price 
and Romantan41 and Lipset and Schneider26 have shown that changing 
confidence and its direction in one institution does not guarantee 
commensurate changes in another. Hoffman42 and Twenge et al.37 also 
found that there may be demographic influences. However, Cooke and 
Gronke38 argue that noticeable declines in confidence may be the result 
of a public sceptical of many forms of power and may not necessarily 
be bad news.
Clausen et al.18 found a statistically significant negative correlation 
between corruption and confidence in public institutions. Steen43 
compared levels of confidence in institutions across the Baltic States 
with France and Norway. Borowski44 compared frequencies among the 
post-communist countries Lithuania, Poland, Russia, Ukraine, Czech 
and Buryat Republics, while Listhaug25 examined the underlying factors 
influencing confidence in institutions in Norway. 
Research objectives
Here frequencies (see Steen43 and Borowski44) are compared and 
the underlying common sources of influence and distinguishing 
characteristics (see Listhaug25 and Gregg and Banks45) are examined, 
specifically, in the context of unstable democracies, military influence 
in politics, religious beliefs, weak economies and comparably lower 
incomes. The following questions are asked:
1. How do the levels of confidence that African publics have in their 
institutions vary among the countries and compare to those of 
the USA? 
2. What are the underlying common sources of influence that 
characterise the perception of institutions by Africans and how do 
they compare with those of the USA?
Data and methods
The data for this research were obtained from the World Values Survey 
Wave 6 which consisted of 17 questions, V108 to V124, listed earlier, 
and which are common to all countries in comparison. The question was: 
Please look at this card and tell me, for each item, 
how much confidence you have in them. Is it ‘A 
great deal’ (4), ‘Quite a lot’ (3) ‘Not very much’ (2) 
or ‘None at all’ (1). 
Confidence levels were derived from the sum of ‘A great deal’ (4) and 
‘Quite a lot’ (3). The sample size subject to variable ratio for Zimbabwe 
was 1500/17 = 88 to 1; Ghana 1552/17 = 91 to 1; Nigeria 1759/17 
= 103 to 1 and the USA 2232/17 = 131 to 1. Additional World Values 
Survey data for Nigeria in 2000 (Wave 4), Zimbabwe 2001 (Wave 4) and 
Ghana 2006 (Wave 5) were also used to monitor frequency changes 
within countries.
Frequencies were compared, but this comparison alone is considered 
insufficient because of issues relating to the local meaning of constructs 
being influenced by culture and contextual differences.46-48 Therefore 
sets of variables for shared and distinguishing characteristics were also 
compared. Wagner et al.46 argue for the use of a ‘cultural metric’ – a 
set of items or variables that are inter-related and that mutually specify 
each other’s local meaning in a culture or language group. Wagner and 
colleagues argue that only an interaction found in one culture that is 
replicated in another allows the conclusion that the effect is shared.
Cognitive and social psychology studies indicate that individuals and 
groups rely on several sources of meaning embedded in common 
sense. These multiple sources can be directly measured or observed 
as ‘manifest’ variables. The variable ‘religiosity’, for example, can be 
measured directly with the question ‘how religious are you?’ and the 
answer options on a scale of say 0 to 6. Here we expect the respondent 
to aggregate all the meaning sources in a single response. The same 
religiosity can be measured by asking several questions that address 
different sources of meaning for the concept, such as ‘how many times 
do you attend religious services?’, ‘how many times do you pray in a 
day?’, ‘how strongly do you believe in heaven?’, all also measured on 
a scale of 0 to 6. We can then apply a data reduction technique such as 
factor analysis which groups variables by similarities into sense-making 
groups (factors or dimensions) called ‘latent’ (or unobserved) variables. 
The result of the reduction may indicate one underlying sense-making 
group (unidimensional) or several groups (multidimensional). Latent 
variables, factors and dimensions are used interchangeably in this paper. 
The additional advantage of latent variables is that they make up for the 
inconsistencies that may be in the single-variable self-assessment.
Exploratory factor analysis was used to categorise the variables (see 
Appendix 1 in the supplementary material). The assumption of factor 
analysis is that several manifest variables depend on the same latent 
variable and this dependence induces a correlation (relationship) between 
them, denoting the existence of a common source of influence.47,49,50 The 
aim of the factor analysis, as with cultural metrics, is to determine if 
the observed variables can be grouped into sets, thereby establishing 
the ‘semantic scaffolding’46 that a local notion maintains with a set of 
other terms. 
The Factor Analysis function on the SPSS package was used for 
the analyses and the Promax oblique rotation was chosen over its 
orthogonal counterpart as there are significant correlations among the 
items. The extraction method was Maximum Likelihood as findings can 
be generalised to the larger population.51
Findings
Comparing frequencies
Question 1: How do the levels of confidence that African publics have 
in their institutions vary among the countries and compare to those of 
the USA?
Confidence levels were generally higher in African countries than in the 
USA, with the exception of the army and the police, but the rankings 
do vary (Table 1). Confidence levels are spread between 83% and 11% 
in the USA; 86% and 34% in Zimbabwe; 89% and 39% in Ghana and 
between 92% and 28% in Nigeria. This spread may be an indication 
that the countries have different approaches to scale use or that the US 
respondents are more sceptical38 than their African counterparts. The 
highest level of confidence in the USA is in the army while in African 
countries, it is in the churches.
The university is the only institution that occupies one of the first four 
positions across all the countries. Confidence levels in the courts are 
quite close (55% to 57%), except for Nigeria at 46%; the rankings also 
vary, with US respondents ranking courts higher than the other countries. 
While confidence in the police is the second highest in the USA, it is the 
lowest in Nigeria and third to last in Ghana. Confidence in political parties 
occupies the bottom of the table in the USA, Zimbabwe and Ghana, but 
the levels are again different, and is second to last in Nigeria. Confidence 
in central government occupies the same position in the USA, Ghana and 
Zimbabwe, but is at a lower place in Nigeria. Confidence in parliament in 
Zimbabwe and Nigeria occupy the same position, fourth to last, and the 
same position in the USA and Ghana, at second to last. 
In conclusion for Question 1, there are varying levels of confidence 
across cultures and ranking offers additional comparative statistics 
for single items. The higher levels of confidence in African countries 
do not manifestly reflect their poorer economic indices and status as 
emerging democracies. 
Table 2 shows that confidence in churches has remained very high 
across the three African states, despite falling slightly in Nigeria and 
Ghana. Confidence in the army has also increased across all three 
African countries but with a higher 17-point rise in Nigeria. The last 
military intervention in Nigeria ended in 1999 – 1 year before the first 
survey in 2000; there were 12 years of uninterrupted civilian rule by 
the next wave in 2011. Confidence in parliament has risen marginally in 
Zimbabwe but dropped in Nigeria, with an even steeper drop in Ghana. 
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The percentage of ‘Don’t know’ responses is nil for churches in 
Nigeria in 2000 and Ghana in 2007 and is low (1%) in Zimbabwe in 
2001. It is 1–3% for the police across the countries. These figures may 
indicate high levels of familiarity34,35 with the institutions and much less 
ambivalence in the population about their roles. For other institutions, 
‘Don’t know’ is comparatively high in Zimbabwe in 2001. The figure 
for unions is surprising, given their involvement in politics.52 The year 
2001 was a period of political and economic uncertainty in Zimbabwe 
as inflation had hit 76% and was climbing – reaching 24 400% in 2007 
from 17% in 1990 when the Lancaster constitution expired and anxieties 
were high over land redistribution.23,53 It is plausible, given the ongoing 
crisis, that the public in Zimbabwe was reluctant to express an opinion 
about these institutions.
Structural analysis and cultural metrics
Question 2: What are the underlying common sources of influence that 
characterise the perception of institutions by Africans and how do they 
compare with those of the USA?
Cronbach’s alpha54, a measure of internal consistency, for all 17 variables 
for the four countries was 0.9, which indicates high scale reliability. The 
Pearson’s correlation table also showed significant positive correlations 
(association) among all items in the Ghanaian data at 0.01 level of 
significance and the highest was between police and courts at 0.617, 
while the lowest was between the unions and the churches at 0.121. 
All variables were significantly positively correlated at the 0.01 level for 
the Nigerian data, except between parliament and churches which was 
significant at 0.05, and the highest correlation of 0.627 was between 
parliament and the central government while the lowest (0.057) was 
between parliament and churches. All variables were significantly 
positively correlated for the Zimbabwean data at a 0.01 level, except 
environmental organisations which did not show any significance 
with churches (0.034) and the highest correlation of 0.663, as for the 
Ghanaian data, was between the police and the courts. With the US data, 
labour unions were not significantly correlated with churches (0.024) 
and environmental organisations were also not correlated significantly 
with churches (-0.024) and armed forces (0.026). All other variables 
showed significant correlations at the 0.01 level with the highest between 
parliament and political parties at 0.687. These results are given in the 
supplementary material.
A hypothetical theoretical analysis will split the 17 institutions into 
collectivist and individualistic countries. Another approach, informed by 
functions, will split them into private and public sector. Both assumptions 
presuppose a two-factor solution. Several solutions were considered 
based on the statistical outputs (scree plots), the meaningfulness of the 
factors and the research question. A five-factor solution was found to be 
most appropriate for comparison and labelled as follows: ‘not-for-profit 
or charities’; ‘political’; ‘social order’; ‘watchdog or fourth estate’ and 
‘for-profit’ or ‘business’. The Nigerian data, however, fit best with a four-
factor solution as a fifth displays only one variable which is negligible 
because it does not have a substantive interpretation.50 The factors 
reveal the underlying order and the names are a concept operationalised 
by the factor. The factor labels thus comprise a set of concepts with 
high generalising power for cross-national studies.45 The proportion of 
each factor shows its relative weight or importance in the analysis when 
compared with the others. The rank ordering of each variable also shows 
its relative importance within each meaning unit.
The figures for ‘communalities’, the extent to which a variable associates 
with others, are very low for churches in Nigeria (0.163), Ghana (0.11) 
and Zimbabwe (0.06), and were thus excluded. The low communalities 
for churches is an indication that they are quite unique and have little 
underlying characteristics in common with other institutions. For the USA, 
a communality of 0.25 for churches is also low; however, it was included 
in the analysis because the factor loadings were above the threshold of 
0.3. Most of the other communalities55 were above 0.40 across countries 
and where they dipped slightly below, the influence of the large sample 
sizes, the loadings on the pattern matrix and the essence of the variable’s 
inclusion in cross-cultural comparisons were considered. 
Table 1: Confidence levels ranking (%): ‘A great deal’ and ‘Quite a lot’
USA Zimbabwe Ghana Nigeria
Army 83 Churches 86 Churches 89 Churches 92
Police 70 Universities 81 Universities 85 Banks 71
Universities 62 Charities 74 Banks 79 Television 71
Charities 62 Major companies 72 Army 79 Universities 70
Churches 59 Banks 70 Charities 76 Major companies 66
Courts 55 Environmental organisations 66 Major companies 75 Army 63
Women’s organisations 51 Women’s organisations 64 Women’s organisations 72 Charities 62
Environmental organisations 48 Army 57 Television 72 The press 62
Civil service 46 Courts 56 Environmental organisations 69 Civil service 59
Banks 39 Civil service 53 Civil service 67 Women’s organisations 57
Major companies 33 Police 52 The press 59 Environmental organisations 56
Central government 32 Central government 47 Central government 59 Unions 47
Unions 24 Television 46 Unions 58 Courts 46
Television 23 Parliament 45 Courts 57 Parliament 39
The press 22 Unions 44 Police 55 Central government 36
Parliament 19 The press 35 Parliament 54 Political parties 31
Political parties 11 Political parties 34 Political parties 39 Police 28
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All the statistical outputs indicate the method was appropriate. The 
determinant was 0.001 for the USA and Nigeria, 0.003 for Ghana and 
0.002 for Zimbabwe. For all countries, the Kaiser–Meyer–Olkin Measure 
of Sampling Adequacy was 0.9; Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity was highly 
significant (p<0.001) and the goodness-of-fit test was also highly 
significant (p<0.001). Cronbach’s alpha was also computed separately 
for items relating to the different factors.54,56 Minimum loading for 
interpretation was set at 0.3.51,57 
The results show 10 variables with shared positions in a factor across 
countries – the similarities – but the positions vary. The variables are 
environmental NGOs, women’s organisations, charities, parliament, 
parties, central government, television, the press, major companies 
and banks. There were differences in the positioning of the other seven 
factors denoting the unique combinations of each culture. 
With the US data, the first dimension (factor) with a proportion of 34% (also 
referred to as explained variance) is dominant, hence most important50 
and comprises environmental organisations with the highest loading of 
0.85 followed by women’s organisations, charities, universities, labour 
unions and civil service (Table 3). The factor was named ‘not-for-profit’ 
based on the composition of the institutions and the loadings profile. 
Unions, however, has a cross loading on the watchdog. 
The first dimension is also the most important in Ghana (35%) but with 
fewer institutions: women’s organisations, charities and environmental 
organisations. The shared profile of the dominant dimension indicates 
similarity between the Ghanaian and US data. 
The variables with shared values in the ‘not-for-profit’ factor for 
all four countries are the charities, women’s organisations and 
environmental NGOs. 
Table 3: The not-for-profit cultural metric
US
A
Zi
m
ba
bw
e
Ni
ge
ria
Gh
an
a
Factor 1 2 4 1
Environmental NGOs 0.85 0.70 0.56 0.67
Women’s organisations 0.82 0.74 0.91 0.82
Charities 0.70 0.63 0.66 0.80
Universities 0.58
Labour unions 0.34*
Civil service 0.31
% variance 34 10 3 35
Cronbach’s alpha 0.8 0.7 0.8 0.8
*Cross loading
Dimension one for Nigeria (Table 4) is also the most important at 37% and 
is populated by political institutions. Central government has the highest 
loading of 0.87 followed by parliament and political parties. It also features 
the police, courts and labour unions – an association that signifies an 
underlying feeling of an autocratic system. It provides plausible evidence 
of Nigeria being more autocratic than Ghana which, despite being more 
collective, has been credited with the emergence of good autocrats.32 It also 
Table 2: Changing levels of confidence in African countries (%)
Nigeria Zimbabwe Ghana Nigeria Zimbabwe Ghana
2000 2011 2001 2011 2007 2011 DKa 2000 DKa 2001 DKa 2007
Churches 95 92 82 86 90 89 0 1 0
Army 46 63 55 57 76 79 2 11 1
The press 63 62 49 35 54 59 2 11 4
Television 71 71 52 46 69 72 1 11 2
Unions 63 47 46 44 46 58 3 26 9
Police 34 28 63 52 54 55 1 3 1
Courts 46 56 62 57 1
Central government 46 36 48 47 71 59 4 7 1
Political parties 43 31 24 34 39 3 18
Parliament 43 39 43 45 63 54 5 14 2
Civil service 69 59 53 53 59 67 3 10 4
Universities 70 81 85
Major companies 68 66 67 72 55 75 3 12 6
Banks 71 70 79
Environmental organisations 58 56 45 66 59 69 4 35 6
Women’s organisations 50 57 46 64 64 72 7 22 5
Charities 62 74 64 76 6
N 2022 1759 1002 1500 1534 1552 2022 1002 1534
a‘Don’t know’ response
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indicates that the separation of powers between the judiciary, the police and 
the executive branch remains in doubt in Nigeria.9,10 The labour unions are 
also known to be divided between those who support the ruling elite and 
those against and may account for the cross loading with watchdog. 
Table 4: The political cultural metric
US
A
Zi
m
ba
bw
e
Ni
ge
ria
Gh
an
a
Factor 2 1 1 2
Labour unions 0.33*
Civil service 0.39 0.38
Parliament 0.98 0.94 0.82 0.95
Political parties 0.76 0.70 0.75 0.60
Central government 0.71 0.48* 0.87 0.38*
Police 0.57
Courts 0.53
% variance 8 34 37 7
Cronbach’s alpha 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8
*Cross loading
Dimension one, at 34%, is also the most important for Zimbabwe (Table 4) 
and is populated, as for Nigeria, by the parliament, political parties and 
central government, indicating strong similarity between both countries. 
For Zimbabwe, however, the police and courts load on the social order 
metric and labour unions on watchdog. Comparing Ghana and Zimbabwe, 
civil service loads on the political metric and central government has a 
cross loading with the social order category for both countries. 
The rank ordering within the dimension also shows that parliament is 
above the parties and central government in all countries except Nigeria, 
where the central government is highest. 
Table 5: Watchdog cultural metric
US
A
Zi
m
ba
bw
e
Ni
ge
ria
Gh
an
a
Factor 4 3 3 3
Labour unions 0.33* 0.34 0.31*
Armed forces 0.50 0.32
Television 0.85 0.77 0.66 0.80
The press 0.75 0.84 0.85 0.79
% variance 4 4 4 4
Cronbach’s alpha 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7
*Cross loading
The press and television comprise the watchdog across countries but 
labour unions also load here in the USA, Nigeria (cross loadings) and 
Zimbabwe. The armed forces in Nigeria and Ghana also belong to this 
group. This is not unexpected in Nigeria and Ghana given the long period 
of military rule as the public may still see the soldiers as a check on the 
politicians. Zimbabwe had no experience of military rule as at the time 
of data collection in 2011. The threat of military intervention, however, 
remains high in African countries following the recent coup in Egypt5 and 
the November 2017 putsch in Zimbabwe.
Table 6: For-profit/business cultural metric
US
A
Zi
m
ba
bw
e
Ni
ge
ria
Gh
an
a
Factor 5 4 2 4
Universities 0.74 0.79 0.68
Civil service 0.47
Major companies 0.73 0.79 0.79 0.71
Banks 0.68 0.54 0.72 0.72
Churches 0.30*
% variance 4 3 9 3
Cronbach’s alpha 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.8
*Cross loading
The for-profit category features major companies and banks across all 
countries. In addition, and as a mark of different cultures, universities 
in Ghana, Nigeria and Zimbabwe also load strongly on this factor. The 
loading of universities on this metric is a major surprise as universities 
are traditionally for teaching and research and not profit centres. The civil 
service in Nigeria also loads on this factor, which may be explained by 
the relatively high level of corruption among public sector workers. Also, 
interesting for this group, is the loading of churches in the USA, although 
it is not very high at 0.30. Churches in the USA also load with the same 
level (0.30) on the social category.
Table 7: The social order cultural metric
US
Zi
m
ba
bw
e
Gh
an
a
Factor 3 5 5
Central government 0.45* 0.32*
Police 0.92 0.75 0.86
Courts 0.61 0.84 0.74
Armed forces 0.54 0.38
Churches 0.30*
% variance 6 3 3
Cronbach’s alpha 0.7 0.8 0.8
*Cross loading
The social order category also has cross loadings of central government 
for Zimbabwe and Ghana. The police and courts are common among 
three countries: the USA, Ghana and Zimbabwe. The armed forces in 
the USA and Zimbabwe also belong to this group in contrast with Nigeria 
and Ghana where they belong to the watchdog group. There are no 
variables for Nigeria in this category; the police and courts are on the 
political factor.
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In conclusion for Question 2, there are five cultural metrics: not-for-
profit, political, social order, watchdog and for-profit. The analyses have 
also shown that the underlying influences of the levels of confidence 
in institutions makes Ghana closer to the USA and Nigeria closer to 
Zimbabwe. It can also be deduced that the lack of separation of courts 
and police from democratic institutions in Nigeria is an indication of a 
continuing autocratic system and the low communalities for churches 
shows they are not seen by the public as an institution in the same 
manner in which other institutions are viewed.
Limitations and further research
The high levels of ‘Don’t know’ in the responses for Zimbabwe need to 
be further interrogated to ascertain if it is a persistent situation or if the 
economic crisis at the time of data collection was responsible for such 
high levels of ambivalence. 
More qualitative research through interviews and multi-country focus 
groups is needed to illuminate the composition of the cultural metrics 
across the countries. Why, for example, do Nigerians see the parliament, 
the political parties, the central government, police and courts as the 
same? Is this an indication that Nigeria is more autocratic than other 
African countries? Why is Ghana closer to a Western democracy, the 
USA, than other African countries in the sample?
Conclusions
Comparing frequencies has shown that poorer economic indices and 
relatively unstable democracies have not translated into comparatively 
lower confidence in African institutions as levels are higher than those 
observed in the USA. Frequencies range between 83% and 11% in the 
USA; 86% and 34% in Zimbabwe; 89% and 39% in Ghana and 92% 
and 28% in Nigeria. These percentages may, however, indicate different 
approaches to scale use or that US respondents are more sceptical38 
than Africans. 
The rankings show that different institutions occupy different positions 
in the hierarchy and those with almost the same position have different 
levels of confidence. The army occupies the highest position in the USA 
and churches occupy the highest position in Africa. The university is 
always in the first four positions across all countries. Confidence in 
central government occupies the same position in the USA, Ghana and 
Zimbabwe, but is lower in Nigeria.
The underlying common sources of influence show that the 17 
institutions can be grouped into five latent categories: ‘not-for-profit’; 
‘political’; ‘social order’; ‘watchdog’ and ‘for-profit or business’. The 
positioning of the variables on the factors show the shared elements 
and differences which distinguish the cultures and confirms the power 
of the method for cross-national studies. It can be inferred that charities, 
women’s organisations and environmental NGOs are more important 
and, by extension, more central to the public in the USA and Ghana, 
and less so in Nigeria and Zimbabwe. The political order is also more 
important to the public in Nigeria and Zimbabwe. This finding is crucial 
and adds empirical evidence to the effects of relative democratic stability 
in the USA and Ghana compared with Nigeria and Zimbabwe. Ghana is a 
surprise given that, like Nigeria and Zimbabwe, it is a young democracy 
with a recent history of colonial and military rule.
This study has shown that comparing frequencies and rankings, or 
dividing along the lines of individualistic versus collective or private 
and public sector, masks the dynamic distribution of the systems of 
meaning in the local cultures and the latent variables approach offers 
a more conceptually sound categorisation informed by shared and 
distinguishing institutions. The findings show that such measures can 
be used as reliable markers of culture for cross-national studies and in 
longitudinal studies to monitor changing perspectives. 
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